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THE SWISS EXPERIENCE WITH 
NEUTRALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE 
FOR MALTA 
Dietrich Kappeler 
The permanent neturality of Switzerland is the product of a long historical 
evolution. It began as a practice and eventually became a legal S(ltt\l8 embodied 
in international legal instruments and recognized by the fattentational 
community. Malta's neutrality is due to rather recent developtnentaand is based 
on a policy decision later embodied in an agreement with Italy and a 
constitutional provision. It owes as much to the ideas of non &Kgnment as to 
the concept of perpetual neutrality in a precise legal sense. Tncre may thus 
be some advantage in relating the Swiss experience in order to ace what lessons 
Malta may be able to draw from it as regards her own external policies. 
1. Neutrality and International Law (t) 
1.1. Neutrality in times of armed conflict 
The very expression "neutrality" has been coined for a context where 
two or more States are in a relation of war and others must decide whether 
to join one side in the conflict or try to keep out of it alto�ther. Thus, in 
traditional manuals of international law, neutrality is dealt with together with 
the laws of war 2. For the same reason, it was codified together with the laws
of war at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 3 • 
Neutrality in this legal sense presupposes a state of war between two or 
more States. Such a state used to be easy to identify as States were wont to 
declare war on each other before putting their armies in the field. In the rare 
cases of an armed attack not preceded by a declaration of war, the attacked 
State would immediately declare war on the aggressor. It was then prudent 
for third States, especially those situated in the neighbourhood, to declare their 
neutrality if they did not want to be drawn into the conflict. As a result of these 
actions, the laws of war would govern the relations between the belligerents 
whereas the laws of neutrality would govern the relations between each of the 
latter and the States which had declared their neutrality. When the war came 
to an end, normally by means of a peace treaty between the belligerents, the 
laws of peace would automatically apply again to the relations between all 
concerned in lieu of the laws of war and neutrality. 
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Neutrality in a legal sense was therefore a temporary status following a 
policy decision of the State(s) concerned. Precise rights and obligations both 
of the belligerents and the neutrals ensued which matched each other 4 • The
neutral State was not allowed to participate in or interfere with the hostilities 
in any any manner whatsoever. In exchange the belligerents had an obligation 
to respect the neutral State's territory and nationals as well as its ships on the 
sea. The neutral State was entitled and indeed obliged to defend its territory 
against any encroachments, and this included in more recent years the air 
space 5 • The neutral State wa� not permitted to provide weapons and other 
means of warfare to a belligerent and the other side was therefore authorised 
to search neutral ships for such ''contraband". Nationals of the neutral State 
within the territory of a belligerent could not� treated as enemy aliens. There 
were less strict rules regarding economic relations, although it was generally 
understood that a neutral State should not overtly favour one belligerent side 
at the expense of the other 6 • 
Since 1945, war as a means of conducting international relations is 
outlawed by article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. Only in self-defence 
may States still use armed force. As a result, war is no longer declared, and 
where one breaks out, each side claims that the other has been attacking it 
or threatening t9 do so and that it therefore is acting in self-defence. Wars are 
now known as international armed conflicts, whose existence is determined 
by the de factual use of armed force. The laws of war are applicable to them 
and third States may still declare their neutrality 7• However, there is a strong
body of opinion according to which neutrality is no longer possible where the 
United Nations are engaged in military activities against a State found gu�lty 
of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. At least 
members of the United Nations are then seen as legally bound to side with 
the organization against the violator of the Charter. 
1.2 Neutralisation, policies and legal restraints of permanent neutrality 
Neutralisation is a legal undertaking by a State, either of its own free will 
or imposed on it by a treaty, to act in a manner which will prevent it from 
becoming involved in future armed conflicts 8 . This was the case of Belgium 
when its separation from the Netherlands was recognized by the major European 
powers in the last century. Neutralisation was also agreed on with regard to 
Laos at the Indochina Conference of Geneva in 1963. Switzerland obtained 
her neutralisation,at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 / 5 as shall be shown below. 
Finland undertook to remain neutral in all future conflicts that might involve 
the Soviet Union in a treaty offriendship signed with the latter in 1948. Austria 
amended her constitution_ in 1955 to include an obligation to observe perpetual 
neutrality and then notified this fact to all States with which she had diplomatic 
relations. On the other hand, Sweden has since the last century followed policies 
meant to prevent her from becoming involved in any sort of armed conflict 
and Ireland has done the same since becoming independent in 1921. Costa 
Rica has adopted a neutral stance by voluntarily abolishing its armed forces 
in 1947. 
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A State which has opted for permanent neutrality has to accept certain 
restraints in the conduct of its foreign policy 
9 
. These have never been clearly 
defined by an international convention but are rather the product of long-lasting 
practice, especially as followed by Switzerland. The main restraint is the 
impossibility for a neutral country to enter any kind of military alliance. 
Moreover it should follow general policies that render its permanent neutrality 
credible, in particular by not entering such close links with one or several 
countries as would make it impossible to remain neutral should the latter be<;ome 
involved in an armed conflict. Until recently, this was seen as meaning that 
a permanently neutral State could not join a supranational organization· such 
as the European Community. 
1.3 Neutralit'y and non-alignment 
Non-alignment is an attitude evolved by countries of the third world as 
well as Yugoslavia who wished to remain outside the conflict opposing the two 
blocs led respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States 10 . Since 
1962, these countries form a loose association known as the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Over the years they have worked out some basic principles which 
must be adhered to if a country wishes to be known as non-aligned. These 
somewhat resemble the restraints imposed on States following a policy of 
permanent neutrality, but only as regards the two superpowers and their 
military alliance systems. Thus a non-aligned country may not enter a military 
agreement with a superpower or a country bound to a superpower by a military 
alliance. But otherwise non-aligned countries remain practically free in the 
choice of their foreign policy. In particular they may remain close to one power 
bloc and hostile to the other and are in no way obliged to assume an attitude 
of equidistance. Non-aligned countries also may set up military alliances among 
themselves and assist each other in armed conflicts, at least to the extent this 
is not in violation of the UN Charter. 
2. Antecedents of Swiss Neutrality 11 
2 .1. The Swiss Confederation around 1500 and its internal contradictions
The Swiss Confederation traces its origins back to an alliance concluded 
in 1291 by three small alpine communities in which they promised each other 
assistance against any feudal power that might want to deprive them of the 
privilege of freedom of the Empire all enjoyed 12 . The alliance managed to
survive initial onsloughts and to attract or conquer other rural and urban 
communities with similar aims until it covered about two thirds of the present 
territory of Switzerland. As a result the confederated communities had 
developed considerable military strength which they sometimes put at the service 
of surrounding monarchs such as the king of France. After some resounding 
\·ictories on the battlefield, the Swiss decided to engage in a bit of imperialism 
of their own and involved themselves in the struggle for the control of Northern 
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Italy. However these endeavours were . not universally popular and a 
considerable rift developed asto-the advisability of continu1ng with expansionary 
poli_cies. As a result the forces sent across the Alps became soon insufficient 
for the task set for them and eventually were beaten at Marignano in 1515
by the king of France. 
During the same period Switzerland became split as regards the movement 
of reformation of the church. Some cantons became protestant whereas other 
remained catholic and some contained both communities. This led even to 
religious wars among cantons. As a result the view came to prevail that if she 
did not want to break apart and be swallowed up by her neighbours, Switzerland 
should henceforth abstain from any active involvement in armed conflicts 
beyond her borders. Instead, individual·cantons made armed forces available 
to neighbouring rulers as mercenaries whose involvement in battles did not 
affect the canton of origin or Switzerland as a whole. 
2.2. Swiss neutrality during the 30 years war 
This war, which ravaged much of Europe between 1618 and 1648, was 
in part a war of religion and the Swiss cantons were often under considerable 
pressure to join the side close to their particular religious views. This only 
confirmed the Swiss in their conviction that their only salvation lay in keeping 
out of any military involvement altogether. The practice they then followed 
has become the foundation of the classical law of neutrality, aloeit with one 
exception. The Swiss pushed non-involvement so far as not to interfere with 
armed forces crossing their territory as long as they did so peacefully. 
Wh;n an overall arrangement known as the Peace of Westphalia was 
reached in 1647 and 1648, the Swiss reaped the benefits of their attitude in 
that they secured recognition of their formal independence from the Holy 
Roman Empire and a degree of recognition of their practice of non-involvement 
in the armed conflicts of their neighbours. 
2.3 Switzerland during the Napoleonic wars 13 
For nearly 150 years, Switzerland was able to preserve her position of de 
facto neutrality and to avoid involvement in the numerous wars faught by her 
neighbours. But this happy state of affairs came to an abrupt halt in 1798,
when the then General Bonaparte decided to forcibly bring the benefits of the 
revolution to Switzerland and occupied most of her territory. A united Helvetic 
Republic was proclaimed, with no regard for the country's ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural and religious diversity. As a result unrest and military coups were the 
order of the day and the armies of France and her enemies criss-crossed the 
country, with major battles being faught on its territory. Eventually Napoleon 
imposed a new, less unified constitution which made Switzerland a sort of 
French protectorate. 
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3. The legal foundation of Switzerland's present neutrality
3.1. The Congress of Vienna's handling of Switzerland 14 
Vol. XVI 
As the Napoleonic armies collapsed, the Swiss cantons reconstituted their 
loose alliance of soereign entities and sought recognition of this confederation 
at the Congress of Vienna. They also sought restoration of their perpetual 
neutrality. 
The powers of the Congress in their turn had no wish to become involved 
in battles over who would control the several passages over the Alps within 
Switzerland. They admitted that the existence of an independent and neutral 
Switzerland was indeed in their interest. They produced a Declaration on March 
20th, 1815 that they would recognise and guarantee Swiss neutrality provi�ed 
that Switzerland formally accepted such a declaration. However the return of 
Napoleon for 100 days interrupted everything and Switzerland was forced to 
let the allied troops pass through her territory in order to invade France. After 
the final demise of Napolean, negotiations were resumed on the basis of a Swiss 
draft declaration of neutrality, which was endorsed by the major powers on 
November 20th, 1815 with only minor alterations. 
The Declaration states that the powers formally recogni�e the perpetual 
neutrality of Switzeriand and guarantee the integrity and inviolablity of the 
latter's territory. The powers moreover decided to neutralise parts of Savoy 
contiguous to Switzerland for better protection of the latter's neutrality. 
3.2. Switzerland, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the League of 
Nations: Differential Neutrality 15
Switzerland sent negotiators to the Peace Conference of 1919 to ensure 
that her neutrality would not be affected. In fact the Treaty of Versailles formally 
recognised it while abolishing the neutralisation of Upper Savoy and 
Switzerland's right to militarily occupy that territory if this was required in 
the interest of her own neutrality. Switzerland herself was not a signatory of 
the Treaty of Versailles, but she had expressed her agreement with the above 
provisions. 
More difficult was the question of whether Switzerland could become a 
member of the newly created League of Nations. The Covenant of the League 
set up a system of collective security under which member States were obliged 
to participate in punitive actions decided by the League's Council against 
members who contravened the principles and rules of the Covenant. Such 
actions could take the shape of economic sanctions or military operations. 
Switzerland, which had just bought the confirmation of her neutrality by 
enouncing her rights in Upper Savoy, was in no mood to abandon her status 
in order to become a member of the League. After long negotiations, a 
compromise was found. The Council of the League, in a declaration of February 
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13, 1920, noted the unique nature of Swiss neutrality and its contribution to 
international peace, which meant that its continuation lay in the interest of 
the international community. Switzerland was formally freed from any 
obligation to take part in military sanctions or to allow armed forces engaged 
in such sanctions to pass through her territory. In excha�ge she agreed that 
she would participate in non-military sanctions, even at the risk of somewhat 
compromising a policy of strict neutrality. As a result, Switzerland became 
a member of the League following a national referendum which endorsed the 
p'roposal of the government to that effect. 
3.4. Switzerland's declaration of return to integral neutrality �n 1938 16 
Switzerland became a very active member of the League under what 
became known as a policy of "differential neutrality". When Italy invaded 
Abyssinia in 1935, she willingly voted for economic sanctions and decreed a
partial embargo on exports to Italy. However, when it became clear that Britain 
and France had only voted for the sanctions to ignore them thereafter, 
Switzerland began to reconsider her position. Two of her neighbours, Italy 
and Germany, had left the League and Austria was thereafter absorbed by 
Germany, leaving only France as a neigbour still belonging to the League. 
This let the Swiss Government to issue a statement on May 11th, 1938 according 
to which Switzerland henceforth would return to a policy of �rict neutrality, 
while not changing in any other way her attitude with regard to the League 
of Nations. 
4. The practice of Swiss neutrality
4 .1. 19th century conflicts 17 
During the first decades following the peace settlement of 1815 no major 
military conflicts occurred in the immediate neighbourhood of Switzerland. 
However, the general political climate in the surrounding countries led to a 
considerable stream of prominent refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland. This 
caused major difficulties with the governments concerned, which Switzerland 
found hard to handle as she still was a loose association of sovereign entities 
with hardly any central competences. From the 1830s onwards, Switzerland 
became absorbed in her internal affairs as an ever stronger movement promoted 
liberal reforms within the cantons and sought to establish a federal State with 
relatively .strong central powers. This led to skirmishes between progressive 
and conservative cantons. The latter eventually sought an alliance with Austria 
to preserve the status quo, in clear contradiction with the official policy of 
neutrality. A brief civil war ensued which ended with the victory of the 
progressive cantons and the immediate drafting of a federal constitution which 
was adopted in 1848, the very year when socialist revolutions broke out all 
around Switzerland. 
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The new federal State managed to weather this first storm only to become 
involved in aJar more perilous situation when the people of the Canton of 
Neuchatel, which up to then had as its nominal ruler the king of Prussia, decided 
to set up a republic. The king seriously considered military intervention but 
eventually relented under strong pressure from Britain. Swiss neutrality had 
also to be preserved during the war of Italian unification, in which Austria 
and France·took also part and as a result of which Upper Savoy changed hands 
and became French. The brief war between Prussia and her German allies 
and Austria in 1866, in which Italy took also part, was again involving 
immediate neighbours. Although some skirmishes took place close to the border, 
the war was over so quickly that Switzerland hardly had time to organize armed 
protection of her frontiers. On the other hand, the Franco-Prussian war of 
1870 I 1 several times menaced to engulf border regions of Switzerland as 
military strategies of both sides contemplated sending their armies through-Swiss 
territory in order to attack the enemy from an unexpected direction. Eventually 
the only major incident was the surrender of a whole French army to the Swiss 
who had to disarm it and find food and shelter for thousands of-men. 
4. 2. The first world war 18 
This war began with the invasion of Belgium, another neutral country, 
by Germany, in complete disregard of relevant treaty obligations. Switzerland 
had therefore to fear a similar fate, all the more so as both France and Germany 
had plans to attack all the more so as both France and Germany had plans 
to attack each other by sending armies through Swiss territory. Fortunately 
no such plans were implemented. Thanks to her neutrality Switzerland also 
overcame the internal problem of her German-speaking population 
sympathising with Germany and the French-speakers sympathising with France. 
Switzerland also played a major role as protecting power of the belligerents 
and as a centre of exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war. Towards 
the end of the war public opinion became ever more favourable towards an 
international institution to maintain peace, as a result of which the later decision 
to join the League of Nations was greatly facilitated. 
4.3. The inter-war period l9 
As already indicated, Switzerland became an active member of the League 
of Nations. She also developed further the idea that neutrality in legal and 
military terms does not mean ideological neutrality. After it was found that 
the Soviet diplomatic mission had been involved in subve�ive actvities, 
diplomatic relations with the USSR were broken and Switzerland strongly 
objected to the idea of admitting that country to the League of Nations. 
However it was the rise of fascism and national-socialism which brought 
new perils for Switzerland's neutrality. Germany openly claimed German­
speaking Switzerland as hers and so did Italy with regard to Italian-speaking 
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regions. This led to a closing of ranks among the Swiss population of all 
languages and political persuasions against the two would-be annexors and their 
iqeology. Especially Germany became the target of violent press attacks which 
led to extremely tense situations. The Swiss government however refused to 
control the press, further emphasizing the non-ideological aspect of Swiss 
neutrality. 
4.4. The second world war 20 
Swiss military preparation for self-defence had been stepped up during 
the last pre-war years and full mobilization took place as soon as the war broke 
out. The most crucial moment appear�d to be May and June 1940, when 
Hitler's armies overran France and Mussolini's troops tried to meet with them 
along the Swiss border. This failed to materialise thanks to strong French 
resistance, so that until 1944 landlocked Switzerland had access to the sea 
through a nominally independent part of France. But in fact she was surrounded 
by Axis powers and their subjects and in no position to maintain an even-handed 
approach to both sides in the war. As allied troops drove Germany out of France 
and Italy, there was again a risk that Swiss territory might be crossed. 
Moreover, Switzerland came under very strong pressure to participate in the 
economic boycott of Germany and to hand over to the allies all German 
property. In difficult negotiations a solution was reached after the war which 
did not overly compromise the general attitude of neutrality of Switzerland. 
4.5. Swiss neturality and the UN 21
The United Nations Organization was set up as an alliance against the 
Axis powers while the second world war still on. In such a body, there was 
no room for neutrals who were only allowed to send observers to San Franciso. 
The observers from Switzerland concluded in their report to the government 
that the new organization had powers to enforce participation in economic and 
military sanctions, even against non-members, which would make it impossible 
for Switzerland to maintain her traditional neutrality as a member. Thus, when 
after the end of the war the Organization invited neutral countries to become 
members, Switzerland, contrary to Finland, lrdand and Sweden, did not apply. 
In the years that followed, when the UN was split into two camps by the 
cold war, there appeared to be no reason for Switzerland to change her attitude. 
Even when neighbouring Austria became neutral in 1955 and nevertheless 
joined the United Nations, Switzerland decided not to follow her example. The 
situation then still was that only neutral Austria separated Switzerland from 
the Warsaw Pact countries, so that there was a strong possibility of wars being 
fought along her borders. But as in prewar days, there was no ideological 
dimensions to Swiss neutrality. Public opfoion was overwhelmingly anti­
communist and supporting the ideals ofWastem democracy. Switzerland was 
even able to be of some help in situations where the UN was directly involved 
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in a conflict, as happended in Korea in the 1950s. To this day Switzerland 
is represented on the armistice control commission -in Panmunjon. 
However, as the United Nations, in the wake of decolonization, became 
increasingly universal, Switzerland found it more and more difficult to claim 
a neutral stance between the Organization and a country it branded a violator 
of the gener.al principles of the Charter. When therefore the Security Council 
instituted economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965. Switzerland found that 
a position of neutrality in the traditional sense would in fact favour Rhodesia 
against the UN. She therefore froze her economic relations at the level of the 
year preceding the imposition of sanctions and followed the UN in refusing 
diplomatic recognition of the breakaway country and eventually even closing 
down her consular offices. 
By the end of the 1960s the Swiss government had come to the conclusion 
that 'the manner in which the Charter provisions relating to collective security 
were applied in practice would not compromise her perpetual neutrality should 
she become a member of the Organization. Parliament approved the proposal 
to seek membership while making a formal statement regardingthe continuing 
policy of neutrality. However, the Swiss people, who under mandatory provision 
of the constitution had to vote on the issue, rejected by 3 to 1 the idea of adhering 
to the UN. 
4.6. Swiss neutrality and the European Community 
Being situated in the centre of Europe, Switzerland had always favoured 
moves towards European unity, if only to end the recurrence of wars among 
her neighbours. On the other hand, the very strict interpretation of her 
neutrality led her government to be very cautious when considering membership 
of organizations promoting such integration. Thus Switzerland became a 
member of the Council of Europe only in 1961. She chose not to join the 
European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 nor the European Economic 
Community of 195 7. Instead she actively participated in the planning and 
implementation of the European Free Trade Area of 1959. 
As the European Communities grew both in size and actual integration, 
Switzerland found that more than two thirds of her trade was with member 
countries and that she had to adjust increasingly her economic legislation to 
Community rules. After the unification of the communities and the launching 
of ambitious plans for monetary and political integration, Switzerland had to 
consider whether staying out was any longer advisable and indeed even feasible. 
Together with other neutral countries of EFTA she initiated negotiations in 
1990 aiming at the creation of a European Economic Space which would 
encompass both the EC and EFT A and under whose rules EFT A countries 
could somehow participate in the making of EC decisions that would affect them. 
The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the same year 
created a completely new situation with the possibility of Eastern European 
countries applying for EC membership having to be considered. Moreover 
1991 27 
Austria, Finland and Sweden felt that the end of the cold war fundamentally 
affected their interpretation of permanent neutrality, to the point where they 
.now could contemplate membership of the EC. This left Switzerland very much 
on her own, with negotiations for a European Economic Space taking an ever 
more disappointing turn. Increasingly, there are voices both in the government 
and parliament and in the public which advocate membership of the EC, even 
at the cost of a considerable re-interpretation of the meaning of perpetual 
neutrality. However, public opinion remains very divided on the issue. 
4. 7. Swiss neutrality and the Gulf war 
The end of the cold war not only affected developments in Europe: It also 
unblocked mechanisms in the United Nations which had been jammed since 
the early days of the Organization. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, 
there was immediate response from the Security Council which condemned 
the aggression and decreed an economic embargo of Iraq. It later decided to 
authorise military enforcement action by troops of member countries which 
had been assembled in Saudi Arabia. All this placed Switzerland into a difficult 
position, as once again economic neutrality would in fact have favoured Iraq. 
The Swiss government therefore decided to join unilaterally the worldwide 
embatgo while re-affirming Swiss neutrality in military matters. Thus, when 
actual military operations began, Switzerland closed her airspace to any military 
aircraft except those transporting medical and other relief equipment. This 
contrasted with Austria, where overflights were readily allowed. 
4.8. An evaluation of Swiss neutrality as it has been practiced 
The following salient traits appear to result from ancient and recent Swiss 
practice: 
1. The purpose of a policy of perpetual neutrality is to allow for formal
neutrality in any kind of war, but more specifically in a war between
neighbours of Switzerland or in which such neigbours are involved.
11. To ensure this, Switzerland must abstain from involvement in any kind
of military alliances and agreements. She must at all times be able to 
dissociate herself from any country engaging in war to the extent necessary
for maintaining a credible and legally consistent neutrality with regard to
such a war. 
111. Swiss neutrality must be armed, i.e. the country must be in a position to
defend herself in times of war against attacks or encroachments from any
belligerent side.
1v. Swiss neutrality is not ideological. Swiss citizens and media are free to 
express their views on other countries and ideologies as long as this does 
not infringe Swiss libel laws. 
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v. Swiss neutrality is not part of Switzerland's written constitution which
makes only a passing reference to it when defining the functions arid powers
of the government. This means that Swiss authorities are relatively free
to define the precise content of their policy of permanent neutrality in the
light of the prevailing international situation. The relatively rigid approach
followed during the 1950s and early 1960s was rather an exception in this
regard.
vi. In times of peace, Switzerland does not feel that permanent neutrality
greatly hampers her freedom in dealing economically with other countries.
The negative attitude as regards accession to the European Community
was dictated by the fact that this is a supranational institution whose
decisions and rules prevail over those of the member States. Moreover,
most members of the EC are also members of the NATO Alliance.
5. ' Comparison with other neutral States 
5 .1. Austria 22
Austrian neutrality dates from 1955, when a peace treaty ending the 
situation resulting from the second world war was being negotiated. Austria 
amended her constitution by including a provision that she would follow a policy 
of perpetual neutrality along the same lines as Switzerland. This was notified 
to all governments with which Austria had diplomatic relations. None objected 
and this is seen as a worldwide recognition of Austrian permanent neutrality. 
Shortly thereafter Austria became a member of the United Nations. Her 
neutrality was mentioned but no special declaration was made as later envisaged 
by Switzerland. Ever since Austria and Switzerland have closely consulted with 
each in other in all matters relating to their neutrality. Austria had a more 
outgoing approach and presently sees no reason to remain outside the EC. She 
has already officially applied for membership. On the other hand, there appears 
to remain a great popular attachment to neutrality as such, so that voices 
suggesting a re-orientation of foreign policy approaches have had a rather 
negative response. 
5.2. Finland 23 
Finnish neutrality is based on a prov1s10n ( art. 4) of her Treaty of 
Friendship with the Soviet Union of 1948, which refers to art. 3 of the Finnish 
Peace Treaty of 194 7,. which in turn refers to an earlier Finnish-Soviet Treaty 
of 1940. The upshot of it is that Finland and the Soviet Union undertake not 
to conclude or accede to an alliance directed against the other side. The Finnish 
view ever since has been that Finland may stay neutral in. the cold war 
confrontation, but with a special obligation to do nothing even remotely hostile 
to the Soviet Union. This led to a very cautious foreign policy, avoiding early 
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accession to such European organizations as the Council of Europe and even 
the European Free Trade Association. Only the lessening of East-West tensions 
in the 1960s and early 1970s have allowed Finland to become a more active 
participant in European affairs 24 . However, until a year ago, the very·idea 
of joining the European Community was seen as totally impossible. After the 
collapse of communist regimes in Easter Europe and the developments in the 
Soviet Union in early 1991, this stance was however completely abandoned 
and Finland now actively seeks membership of the EC. 
5 .3. Sweden 25
Sweden used to be one of the greater military powers of Northern Europe. 
However, since the end of the Napoleonic wars, she has followed a consistent 
policy of avoiding involvement in military conflicts. This let her stay neutral 
also in the first world war, and at least since then, Sweden, in spite of the lack 
of any formal international commitment, is seen as a permanently neutral 
country. As a result, Germany refrained from attacking her in 1940. Sweden 
joined the United Nations as soon as neutrals were invited to do so and she 
has been very active in the Organization. Sweden has been contributing troops 
to most peacekeeping operations and never felt that he neutrality should apply 
in cases where the UN imposed economic or military sanctions. During the 
cold war, Sweden tended to follow a policy of even-hadedness even as regards 
politital statements. She condemned both the USA and the USSR for what 
she saw as breaches of international law, and of all the Eutopean neutrals she 
showed the earliest and deepest affinity with the Non-Aligned Movement. Like 
Switzerland, Sweden found accession to the European Community incompatible 
with her traditional policies of permanent neutrality. After the events of 1990 
however,· she abruptly changed her stance and is now applying for full 
membership. 
5 .4. Ireland 
26
Ireland stayed neutral ia the second world war because of her hostility 
to Britain, stemming from the conditions under which she got independence 
in 1921 and the fact that Britain continued to occupy Northern Ireland. After 
the war, this occasional neutrality was transformed into a policy of permanent 
neutrality, in particular as regards the East-West confrontation. As far as the 
United Nations are concerned, Ireland has never felt that she should remain 
neutral where the Security Council decided to apply economic or military 
sanctions. Irish troops regularly take part in peacekeeping operations. 
5.5. Others 
Since the second world war Costa Rica has declared herself perpetually 
neutral in 1947 and for this purpose dissolved her armed forces. Cambodia 
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tried to remain neutral in the Vietnam War and to gain recognition as a 
perpetually neutral country, but these efforts came to naught when the USA 
·invaded the country in 1971. Laos declared herself neutral in 1962 and this
was recorded by the international conference meeting in Geneva the same year.
However, after the collapse of South Vietnam in 197 5, a communist government
took over in Laos and neutrality was abandoned de facto.
6. Malta's neutrality 27
6 .1. Antecedents 
Under British rule Malta was a11 important strategic asset. There was a 
huge naval base and important forces were stationed in Malta all the time. 
When NA TO was established, Malta became the Mediterranean headquarters 
of the Organization. At independence in 1964, a Mutual Defence.and Assistance 
Treaty was signed with Britain, under which she was able to continue to use 
her military facilities on the islands. 
A rather radical change of policies occurred when the Malta Labour Party 
came to power in 1971. Negotiations were initiated to end British military 
presence, which led to an interim agreement in 1972, under which that presence 
had to be terminated by 1979. The NATO headquarters were removed. In 
1973, Malta became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The idea to 
neutralise the country was launched in 1976. The intention was that Malta's 
neutrality would not only be recognized but also guaranteed by other countries. 
The then Italian Foreign Minister suggested a joint recognition and guarantee 
by Italy, France and the Maghreb countries. However the Government of Malta 
preferred. to negotiate such recognitions and guarantees bilaterally with the 
countries concerned. 
6.2. International and national legal foundation of Malta's neutrality 
In December 1980, Malta and Italy exchanged notes containing a 
declaration that Malta would henceforth be a permanently neutral State. Italy 
undertook to guarantee this neutrality and both sides were to seek recognition 
and guarantee from Mediterranean and other countries . .This exchange was 
ratified and instruments of ratification were exchanged in May 1981. 
Recognition was expressed in reply to requests from Malta by France, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, but none 
of these countries undertook to guarantee Malta's neutrality. To this day, Italy 
remains the sole guarantor. 
On May 15th, 1987, the Constitution of Malta Amendment Act IV was 
adopted, which reproduces the Maltese declaration of 1980 and thus makes 
it a fundamental rule of internal law. 
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6.3. The content of Malta's neutrality 
In the relevant texts it is affirmed that 
Malta is a neutral State, actively pursuing peace, security and social 
progress ... by adhering - to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to 
participate in any military alliance. 
To this are added various undertakings regarding the non-toleration .of 
military bases and the like. There is also an express affirmation that Malta's 
neutrality shall not prevent her from participating in any actions decided by 
the UN Security Council under Chapter 7 of the Charter. 
The combination· of neutrality and non-alignment may surprise at first 
sight. The manner in which it is formulated however clearly indicates that 
Malta's policy of non-alignment is merely an element of her overall policy of 
permanent neutrality. In other terms, she has undertaken to remain neutral . 
in any future conflict except where the UN Security decides military sanctions 
or where she has to react in self-defence against a violation of her neutrality. 
This view is confirmed by the Italian guarantee under which Italy undertakes 
to assist Malta in such situations of violation of her neutrality in conformity 
with the prindple of collective self-defence as formulated in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. 
The antecedents of the Maltese declaration and the manner in which 
foreign policy was conducted after its adoption leave however some room for 
ambiguity. It rather clearly appears that what Malta sought essentially was 
a guarantee of her inviolability by her immediate neighbours on the Northern 
and Southern shores of the Mediterranean. The attitude towards the world 
at large was covered by a policy of non-alignment. In a similar vein one notes 
that under a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded with Libya in 
November 1984, the two sides undertook to exchange military information and 
Malta unilaterally undertook not to allow her territory to be used in any 
agressive design against Libya. This last provision would appear pointless, as 
such abstention is the essence of a policy of permanent neutrality. On the other 
hand, exchange of military information might be seen as rather incompatible 
with that same policy. The clauses in question were abolished by an agreement 
between the two countries of November 1990. 
6.4. The dynamics of Malta's neutrality 
Over the last 20 years, Malta has been an eloquent defender of closer 
relations between the countries around the Mediterranean. She has vainly tried 
to get North African countries included in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and she has obtained from the latter a declaration 
regarding Mediterranean, as well as a special meeting on Mediterranean 
questions in October 1990 in Pahna de Mallorca, where the idea of a Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was mooted. 
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From all this one may conclude that whereas Malta was certainly intent 
on protecting her own security through a guaranteed status of permanent 
neutrality, she also, and probably to a much greater extent, intended to use 
that status as a means of further promoting her ambitious as spokesman for 
closer relations among Mediterranean countries, in particular between those 
on the Northern and Southern shores. 
7. Concluding remarks
7 .1. Comparison of Maltese and Swiss views 
In part the initial incentive to seek neutrality has been the same for both 
countries. Switzerland was situated in the middle of a region of greater powers 
continually at loggerheads with each other and at times vying for the control 
of the Swiss mountain passes over which their armies could be sent from North 
to South or South to North. Malta lies in the very centre of the Mediterranean 
which, in the 1970s, was the object of major power struggles betwe�n countries 
bordering it as well as far away superpowers. Neutrality in both cases, if 
generally recognized by these in the vicinity, became a protection as well as 
a means of avoiding being drafted into one or the other of contending camps. 
Swiss neutrality has however had the additional reason of preventing a 
linguistically, culturally and religiously fragmented country from breaking apart 
under the strains resulting from affinities with neighbouring regions. Malta 
on the other hand is culturally, linguistically and religiously homogenous, so 
that attractions from nearby countries and cultures do not as such threaten 
disruption. 
Swiss neutrality was always seen first and foremost as a m�ans of keeping 
the country out of possible wars. In the field it was wholly successful. Should 
war cease to be a probability in Europe, there would be not much left to justify 
a continued policy of permanent Swiss neutrality. Maltese neutrality, strongly 
influenced by the concept of non-alignment, is much more concerned with 
tensions and conflicts short of war, in particular right now the North-South 
antagonism due to uneven development. The aim of Maltese neutrality in this 
context is less to keep aloof than to have the possibility to act as an intermediary 
and mediator, both politically and economically. 
Swiss neutrality was always armed. The chances of defending the territory 
of Switz�rland are enhanced by its geographical configuration, which allows 
at least in the central part for effective resistance with relatively modest means. 
Switzerland also had the means and the will to keep her armed forces in proper 
preparedness and suitably equipped. Malta is a group of small .islands in the 
middle of the Mediterranean. There is no way in which she could resist 
effectively a determined attempt at, invasion with her own means. Thus the 
choice of neutrality was meant to lessen the danger of invasion and to obtain 
certain guarantees from neighbours and especially Italy. As a result, Malta, 
like Costa Rica practices a non-armed neutrality. Her armed forces serve mostly 
for peace-time purposes. 
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7.2. The objective context: is there room for neutrality in present Europe, 
the Mediterranean, the world at large? 
The heyday of European neutrals - and non-aligned - came with the 
CSCE process, especially in its initial stages, when the N + N (neutral and non­
aligned) Group acted both as go-between and initiator of compromise proposals. 
This role is most likely over as a result of the present multipolarity combined 
with a much greater amount of shared beliefs and goals. New conflicts have 
mainly emerged inside existing composite States and neutrality is much more 
difficult to obseive in such situations, as Austria is currently finding out with 
regard to Yugoslavia. One might also imagine irredentist conflicts between 
States aiming at changes of borders to bring minorities from one cou.ntry to 
another. Here again there may be little room for neutrality as regards countries 
with close affinities to such minorities. Generally, Europe will have to set up 
much stronger central mechanisms to maintain peace and keep order among 
its tumultous populations. Such mechanisQis will not allow for neutrality, as 
their success will be dependent on their commands being obeyed by all. 
The situation in the Medirerranean is very different. The divide between 
European and Arab riparians with Turkey and Israel being neither is likely 
to deepen as regional integration progresses on both sides. There is still a lack 
of cultural and even human mutual understanding which tends to exacerbate 
even minor problems and conflicts. Therefore Malta's self-chosen role as 
mediator will gain in importance even if her means may be inferior to the task 
she has set herself. There is also a danger that economic and cultural links 
with Europe w1l1 easily outweigh the shallow closeness to the Arab world 
resulting from a common language and relatively close human relations. 
However Malta could and should continue to be the focal point of attempts 
to keep the pan-Mediterranean dialogue alive in as ·many fields as possible, 
and in this respect her very special brand of neutrality-cum-non-alignment may 
be of some help, even if this should not be overrated. 
7.3. Conclusion 
For Malta, the long experience of Switzerland with permanent neutrality 
serves mainly as an illustration of the possibilities and limitations of such a 
policy. But the conditions and general environment of the two countries are 
too different to allow for many analogies. Good knowledge of the the Swiss 
experience may help to avoid pitfalls or unjustified ecpectations, but as far as 
practical policies for the future are concerned, Malta will have to find her very 
own way by herself. 
Professor Dietrich Kappeler holds a doctorate in law from the Universitv of Berne, Switzerland. 
He is Director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies. 
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